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ABSTRACT
Objective: Examination of the performance and visual scanning of air-
crews during final approach and an unexpected go-around maneuver.
Background: Accident and incident analyses have revealed that go-
around procedures are often imperfectly performed because of their com-
plexity, their high time stress, and their rarity of occurrence that avails little
time for practice. We wished to examine this experimentally and establish
the frequency and nature of errors in both flight-performance and visual
scanning.
Method: We collected flight-performance (e.g., errors in procedures,
excessive flight deviations) and eye-tracking data of 12 flight crews who
performed final approach and go-around flight phases in realistic full-flight
transport-category simulators.
Results: The pilot performance results showed that two thirds of the crews
committed errors including critical trajectory deviations during go-arounds, a
precursor of accidents. Eye-tracking analyses revealed that the cross-checking
process was not always efficient in detecting flight-path deviations when
they occurred. Ocular data also highlighted different visual strategies between
the 2 crew members during the 2 flight phases.
Conclusion: This study reveals that the go-around is a challenging
maneuver. It demonstrates the advantages of eye tracking and suggests
that it is a valuable tool for the explicit training of attention allocation
during go-arounds to enhance flight safety.
In commercial aviation, the final-approach phase is one of the most dynamic flight segments, for
which safety margins are minimum and time pressure is maximum. Numerous undesired external
events or crew failure to stabilize the flight path or to configure the aircraft for landing could lead to
the execution of a go-around. Flight crews, composed of a pilot flying (PF) and a pilot monitoring
(PM), are trained to land the aircraft or to perform a go-around according to standard operating
procedures (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2015). During go-around, the PF’s task is to
manage the missed-approach flight path while giving instructions to the PM (e.g., retracting the
flaps and the landing gear). The PM carefully monitors the flight path and the status of the aircraft
and executes the PF’s instructions.
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Despite this defined task distribution, more than 25 critical events occurred during go-around execution
between 1985 and 2010. Their consequences were serious in terms of fatalities (954; BEA, 2013). The
Bahrain accident in 2006 (BEA, 2013) is an examplewhen the captain applied incorrect pitch control during
go-around, was distracted by an auditory warning, and continued until the aircraft impacted the sea. The
investigation commission highlighted that the copilot (PM) did not performhismonitoring duties correctly
(BEA, 2000). As emphasized by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the International
Civil AviationOrganization (ICAO), pilots’poor flight-pathmonitoringwas a contributive factor inmost of
major civilian accidents (NTSB, 2013), such as Colgan Air Flight 3407 (Spangler & Park, 2010), Asiana Air
Flight 214 (NTSB, 2015), Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 (Dutch Safety Board, 2010), or more recently UPS
Airlines Flight 1354 (NTSB, 2013) to name a few (UK Civilian Aviation Authority, 2013). Consistently, the
Active Pilot Monitoring Group identified several contributing factors to these events, among which was a
“corporate climate that does not emphasize on monitoring” (FSF, 2014).
To determine the nature and the frequency of errors and the pilots’ related visual scanning during
go-around, the BEA (the French Accident Investigation Bureau) initiated the Aeroplane State
Awareness during Go-Around (ASAGA) study (BEA, 2013). This study consisted of two main
components: a survey and an observational eye-tracking study in full-flight simulators, the core of
this article.
The results of the first component, the survey, reported that a go-around was a rather infrequent
event, although it is considered as a standard maneuver regularly practiced in airlines’ flight
simulators. Indeed, the survey showed that a medium-haul flight crew performed on average one
go-around per year during commercial flight, whereas a long-haul flight crew experienced one go-
around every 5 to 10 years (BEA, 2013). This rather low-frequency experience in realistic settings
may leave the pilots ill-equipped to switch from an expected goal (landing) to a highly-dynamic
procedure that may challenge humans’ mental capacities. Pilots’ response to low-probability events
represents a critical component for aviation safety (Pinet & Sheridan, 2016; Wickens, Hooey, Gore,
Sebok, & Koenicke, 2009). The results of the survey (BEA, 2013) also stressed that pilots identified
three critical elements that made the execution of the go-around complex. First, a dense commu-
nication with air traffic control (ATC) was cited as a possible overloading factor that disturbed the
pilots’ conscious plan of actions, particularly when clearance differed from the expected procedure-
specified go-around trajectory. Second, complex automation management, excessive thrust power,
and rapid, precise actions were considered factors that induced time pressure. Third, pilots were
unanimous in reporting confusion, attentional impairment, and poor crew-resource management
leading to poor task sharing during the go-around maneuver. This situation can reduce flying
performance, as previous research has shown the influence of stress on cognitive performance in
aviation (Dehais, Tessier, Christophe, & Reuzeau, 2010; Pizziol, Tessier, & Dehais, 2014; Starcke &
Brand, 2012; Stokes & Kite, 1994). In particular, time pressure might direct the flight crew to use
fewer channels of information (Stokes, Kemper, & Marsh, 1992; Tessier & Dehais, 2012).
The objective of the second component of the ASAGA study, namely the observational simulator
study, was to assess pilots’ monitoring abilities during final approach and go-around. An interesting
prospect to understand a pilot’s visual scan is to consider eye tracking. Several studies confirmed that
measuring dwell times in the cockpit offered an insight into pilots’ visual behavior (Dehais, Causse,
& Pastor, 2008; Kasarskis, Stehwien, Hickox, Aretz, & Wickens, 2001; Mumaw, Sarter, & Wickens,
2001; Reynal, Rister, Scannella, Wickens, & Dehais, 2017; Sarter, Mumaw, & Wickens, 2007;
Wickens et al., 2008). Additionally, the computation of the number of fixations and saccades can
reveal basic visual strategies, and it can be an indicator of information processing (Dehais,
Peysakhovich, Scannella, Fongue, & Gateau, 2015; Regis, Dehais, Tessier, & Gagnon, 2012).
To link flight performance and eye movements, we designed a scenario in which crews performed a
final approach and a go-around procedure in realistic full-flight (per the National Aviation Authority
[NAA] definition; meaning a high technical level of flight simulation) transport-category aircraft
simulators. One novelty of this study was to collect both the PF’s and PM’s eye movements, a goal
that has rarely been achieved before (Reynal, Colineaux, Vernay, & Dehais, 2016). The scenario included
the main critical features identified during the survey: a nonanticipated go-around (i.e., ATC requested
the go-around at the last moment) and a nonstandard go-around trajectory. Our goal was to determine
the percentage of pilots who would make errors in attempting the go-around and the nature and
frequency of these errors. We collected eye-tracking data to assess the effect of the go-around maneuver
on the PF’s and PM’s dwell time. Additionally, our objective was to relate visual behavior to the errors of
commission and omission in the go-around and to determine how visual behavior affected performance
and determine how instrument-scanning behavior differed from expectations regarding the pilot role
(PF vs. PM).
Material and Method
Participants
Twenty-four French professional airline pilots (PFs M age = 49.8 years, SD = 4.9, mean flight
experience = 14,540 hr, SD = 2573.51; PM’s M age = 41 years, SD = 4.7, mean flight experi-
ence = 8743.5 hr, SD = 2733.3; 2 females: 1 PF and 1 PM) voluntarily participated in this observational
study. Each of the 12 flight crews was composed of a captain (PF) and a first officer (PM). As in real
airline situations, crews were not necessarily familiar with each other and were randomly paired. All
participants were informed about the study and gave written consent before participating.
Protocol
Two different twin-engine simulators were used for the experiment: seven crews flew on a Boeing 777 full-
flight simulator and five crews flew on an Airbus 330 full-flight simulator. Aircraft type was not of
fundamental interest in the study. The crews were instructed that the simulator sessions aimed to study
the human visual system during a standard flight. Importantly, we did not inform the pilots about a
forthcoming go-around. However, pilots knew the published go-around procedure for a selected runway.
This is a specific element of the approach briefing. To increase pilots’workloads, (a) the flightwas conducted
during the night, (b) ATC requested the go-around at the last moment, and (c) ATC’s instructions differed
from the published missed approach procedure, as sometimes happens during go-arounds.
The general scenario was as follows: a night flight lasting about 40 min, taking off from Bordeaux
and heading to Lyon. During descent, ATC asked the pilots to perform a manual Instrument
Landing System (ILS) approach to Runway 35L. The runway became perfectly visible when the
aircraft descended below a height of 1,000 ft. Without advance notice, at a height below 200 ft, ATC
contacted the crew to indicate the presence of traffic on the runway and asked for an immediate
go-around. Unlike the published go-around, which requires the crew to climb in the runway’s axis
on a magnetic heading of 354 to an altitude of 5,000 ft, ATC instructed the crew to turn left on a
heading of 340° and to climb and level off at an altitude of 2,500 ft. This ATC request induced a
go-around at low altitude with a disruption caused by the new trajectory. We expected that this
maneuver combining a turn and a simultaneous climb with an altitude limitation would surprise the
crew and increase time pressure, making flight-path and energy management more difficult.
Measurements
Our analysis first focused on the crews’ performance, such as response time and errors. Second, we
performed group analyses on dwell times and basic eye movements to determine how the onset and
the management of the go-around affected the PF’s and PM’s visual attention allocation. Third, we
related crews’ errors to eye movements through quantitative and qualitative analyses to determine
how PF and PM visual scan affected flight performance.
Pilot Flight-Performance Analysis
A high-definition (HD) video camera was set up in the cockpit to allow us to monitor the flight
parameters displayed on the flight deck, crews’ actions, and their verbal communications. We analyzed
crews’ compliance with standard operating procedures; that is, pilots’ actions and the correct order of
these actions during go-around. The go-around is announced by the PF, who applies full power and
adopts a positive climb, rotating to the go-around pitch target. The PM retracts the flaps andmonitors the
vertical-speed indicator. Once the positive climb is confirmed by the PM, the PF orders “gear up,” and the
action is executed by the PM.During the execution of themaneuver, the crewsmust carefullymonitor the
flight path and the speed. In summary, we used the HD camera to analyze the crews’ reaction time to
execute the maneuver (i.e., from the moment they applied full-throttle to the moment they reached the
requested altitude—2,500 ft—with the correct heading, 340°). The crews’ ability to perform the expected
actions and to read back the clearance instruction was also assessed with the video material. The BEA
experts identified flight path deviation from the go-around requested trajectory (340°, 2,500 ft): Any
lateral deviations exceeding ±20° and vertical deviations greater than 200 ft were considered flight-path
excursions. After the experiment, a debriefing was conducted to collect the PM’s and PF’s subjective data.
Eye Tracking
The participants’ eye movements were recorded using two 50 Hz head-mounted Pertech® eye-trackers.
The participants’ fixations were mapped on an image of reference, chosen for each participant so that it
contained 14 areas of interest (AOIs; see Figure 1). However, to reduce the number of comparisons,
the data analysis was focused primarily on the six AOIs that received the majority of visual scans.
For each participant, we analyzed two flight phases: final approach starting from 2,500 ft, and go-
around (until the stabilization of the aircraft at 2,500 ft). For the purposes of analysis, the data were
categorized by aircraft type (2: Boeing, Airbus), pilot role (2: PF, PM), flight phase (2: final approach,
go-around), and the six most viewed AOIs. First, mean dwell time on each of the six AOIs was
calculated. Second, to perform complementary basic analyses of eye movements, we determined the
occurrence of fixations and saccades through the whole eye-tracking recording. Eye movements
under 30°/s and not exceeding 1° in dispersion were considered as fixations (as in Dehais et al.,
2015). The computation of an eye metric based on the fixation and saccade ratio was then used to
express the balance between the different visual strategies of explore (visual search) and exploit (i.e.,
visual processing) (Goldberg & Kotval, 1999). Similar to Dehais et al. (2015), we first selected eye
movements that resulted in a Cohen’s d value greater than .8, considered a large effect size (Cohen,
1992). This led us to identify four categories of eye movements: (a) short fixations of 40 to 80 ms, (b)
Figure 1. An example of reference images and areas of interests (AOIs) for pilot flying (at left) and pilot monitoring (at right). We
focused our analyses on the six AOIs that received the majority of scans: airspeed (AS), attitude indicator (AI), altitude indicator
(ALT), navigation display (ND), flight control panel (flight control unit for Airbus and mode control panel for Boeing), and out of
the window (OTW).
medium fixations of 180 to 220 ms, (c) long fixations of 340 to 500 ms, and (d) saccades of 140 to
260 ms. We then constructed a modified ratio defined as R = (short fixations + saccades)/(medium
fixations + long fixations). High R values indicate explore behavior (visual search) whereas low R
values expressed exploit behavior (processing; Dehais et al., 2015; Goldberg & Kotval, 1999).
Results
Pilot Performance During the Execution of the Go-Around
All of the participants correctly initiated the go-around procedure andmanaged to stabilize the aircraft in
accordance with the ATC clearance. The mean response time to complete the go-around maneuver (i.e.,
heading 340°, altitude 2,500 ft) was 74.7 s (SD = 14.92). Only 3 aircrews (1, 3, 11) out of 12 were able to
read back the complete go-around clearance on their initial response (i.e., heading 340, altitude 2,500),
and 2 aircrews remembered only one piece of information (2 and 5) and thus had to ask ATC to repeat
the missed instructions. The remaining 7 crews had to call back ATC to repeat the complete clearance so
as to dial the settings in the flight control unit (FCU). Six crews experienced lateral (2, 8), vertical (7, 9,
10), or both lateral and vertical (11) trajectory deviation, mostly due to poor interaction with the FCU (2,
7, 9, 10, 11). Eventually, one PM (1) did not retract the landing gear. Table 1 provides detailed
information about each crew’s performance. No overt differences in performance (i.e., time to complete
the go-around, errors) were observable between the two types of aircraft simulated.
Table 1. Crews’ performance related to visual scanning during go-around maneuver.
Performance Errors PF’s Visual Cross-Checks PM’s Visual Cross-Checks
Aircrew
No. PM PF FCU Settings
Landing
Gear Go-Around Flight Path
1 Landing gear not retracted None ☑ ☐ ☑
2 Dialed an erroneous
heading (240°) although
he announced 340°
Heading deviation
(40°)
☐ ☑ ☐Checked the FMA then shifted
to airspeed/flaps management
3 None None ☑ ☑ ☑
4 None None ☑ ☑ ☑
5 Heading mode not
correctly engaged
None ☑ ☑ ☑
6 None None ☑ ☑ ☑
7 Did not set the altitude on
the FCU
Altitude exceeded
(500 ft)
☑ ☐ ☐Checked the flight path but
quick shift to airspeed/flaps
management when the altitude
was about to be exceeded
8 None Heading deviation
(25°)
☐Excessively
focused on the
vertical trajectory
on the flight
director
☑ ☐Checked only vertical profile
then shifted to airspeed/flaps
management
9 Late setting of the altitude
on the FCU
Altitude exceeded
(600 ft)—activation
of altitude alert
☐ ☐ ☐Excessively focused on the FCU
12 s
10 Announced the vertical
deviation—Altitude
exceeded (1,400 ft) and
activation of altitude alert
Very late settings on
the FCU
(target altitude had
already been
overshot)
☑ ☐ ☑
11 Did not engage the
altitude properly
Altitude exceeded
(200 ft), heading
deviation (20°)
☐ ☐ ☐Excessively focused on the FCU
15s
12 None None ☑ ☐ ☑
Note. Checked box indicates that pilots (pilot monitoring [PM] or pilot flying [PF]) visually cross-checked each other’s actions,
whereas an empty box indicates they did not. Crews who experienced flight-path deviations are highlighted in gray. FCU = flight
control unit; FMA = Flight Mode Annunciator.
Eye Tracking Analyses at the Group Level: Assessing the Impact of the Go-Around on PF’s and
PM’s Visual Attention Distribution
Inferential statistical analyses were performed using R with the “Ezanova” package (see https://www.r-
project.org/). Repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine main and inter-
action effects of the AOIs, the pilot role (PF or PM), and the flight phase (final approach and go-around).
AOI Percent Dwell Time
Preliminary analysis of the eye-tracking data revealed that a vast majority (79%) of the fixations were
focused on the six most-viewed AOIs (i.e., mean dwell time above 5% in at least one condition). Hence,
the subsequent analyses of AOI dwell times were exclusively focused on AOIs defining out-the-window
(OTW), Attitude Indicator (AI), airspeed (AS), altimeter (ALT), navigation display (ND), FCU.
An initial 6 × 2 (6 AOIs × 2 types of aircraft) ANOVA showed no main effect of aircraft type,
F(5, 50) = 2.92, p > .05, η2p = .005; and no Aircraft Type × AOI interaction effect, F(5, 50) = 0.46,
p > .05, η2p = .04). This result was expected, as the flight decks of these two airplanes are similar.
All subsequent analyses were therefore collapsed over airplane type.
To check the consistency of our data, we compared them with those of Sarter et al. (2007; see
Steelman, McCarley, & Wickens, 2011) to suggest that there is generally a close correspondence
between the PF’s scanning behavior recorded here, and the one of the PF in the 747 simulation
(Sarter et al., 2007) during the approach phase. Across five AOIs in our analyses (FCU data were
removed because equivalent data were not available from Sarter et al., 2007), the correlation in mean
dwell time between the two studies indicated a good agreement (r = .88, p < .10).
A 6 × 2 × 2 (6 AOIs × 2 pilots × 2 flight phases) ANOVA on these data yielded a significant effect
of AOI, F(5, 110) = 60.05, p < .0001, η2p = 0.73; and a significant AOI × Pilot interaction, F(5,
110) = 21.21, p < .0001, η2p = 0.49.
Our particular interest was in the shift of (a) total visual attention of the crew, and (b) differential
monitoring by each crew member, as the aircraft moves from a normal final approach to an off-
nominal go-around. The data are presented in a different panel for each AOI (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Distribution of pilot flying’s and pilot monioring’s eye gaze on the six main areas of interest during the final approach (A)
and the go-around (GA). AI = attitude indicator; OTW = out the window; AS = airspeed; ALT = altitude indicator; ND = navigation
display; FCU = flight control unit.
The different changes in scanning behaviors within Figure 2, discussed here, were statisti-
cally significant as indicated by the three-way interaction between pilot, flight phase, and AOI,
F(5, 110) = 8.391, p < .0001, η2p = 0.27. These scanning behaviors within each panel are then
analyzed by the 2 × 2 ANOVA on the four data points within each:
● Both pilots neglected the outside world (OTW) scanning (second panel) during the go-around,
just as both paid more attention to monitor carefully the airspeed indicator (AS; third panel) so
it does not drop below minimum (stall) or exceed maximum (velocity flaps extended limit)
values, and the navigation display (ND; fifth panel). These are reflected in the main effect of
flight phase within each of these three AOIs: OTW, F(1, 22) = 204, p < .001; AS, F(1, 22) = 32.8,
p < .001; ND, F(1, 22) = 10.1, p < .01.
● A differential shift is shown on the attitude indicator (AI; first panel), as revealed by a
significant Pilot × Phase interaction, F(1, 22) = 13.2, p < .01, which received substantially
more attention from the PF (Honest Significant Difference [HSD] < .001) during the
go-around. The PF fixated more on the AI than did the PM (p < .001) when performing
the go-around to apply the correct reference pitch angle to avoid a stall. Another differ-
ential shift, to the FCU, was revealed in the significant Pilot Role × Flight Phase interaction,
F(1, 22) = 17.5, p < .001, which also confirmed that the FCU (sixth panel) received much
more attention shift from the PM than from the PF (HSD < .01.)
Eye Movements and Explore/Exploit Ratio
Following the procedures of Dehais et al. (2015), we measured the explore/exploit ratio. We
conducted a 2 (pilot role) × 2 (flight phase) ANOVA to examine the interaction between the
pilot role and the flight phase on the ratio. Tukey’s HSD test was used for post-hoc comparisons.
The data for the constructed explore/exploit ratio are shown in Figure 3, and the ANOVA
revealed the main effect of the pilot role, F(1, 11) = 10.09, p < .01, η2 = 0.48, corresponding to
higher explore activity for PM. The interaction between the two factors was significant, F(1,
11) = 18.03, p < .01, η2 = 0.62. As Figure 3 shows, during go-around, but not approach, the PM
engaged in much more exploratory behavior than did the pilot. The mean ratio of the PF during
the go-around procedure was significantly lower than the ratio for the PM during final approach
(HSD < .05) and go-around (HSD < .01) phases.
Figure 3. Mean explore/exploit ratios for pilot flying and pilot monitoring for final approach and go-around phases. Higher values
indicate an increase of the explore mode, whereas lower values reflect an increase of the exploitation mode. Bars represent
standard errors.
Pilot Performance and Related Eye Tracking Analyses: Assessing the Efficiency of the PF’s and
the PM’s Visual Scan and Cross-Checking
The previous statistical analyses highlighted the finding that both pilots exhibited different
ocular behaviors during the go-around. Nevertheless, these analyses at a group level could not
distinguish between crews who effectively managed the go-around and crews who did not. For
convenience, we labeled them as best performing crews and poorest performing crews, respec-
tively. To examine what features of scanning might differentiate the two cases, we selected the
six best crews, who did not experience any of the BEA-scored flight path deviations (Crews 1, 3,
4, 5, 6, 12), and the six poorest who did (Crews 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). We performed a logistic
regression with the six main AOIs as predictors and the group performance as binomial outcome
(i.e., best vs poorer). This regression yielded only one of the AOIs, airspeed, that distinguished
the two skill levels (p = .03). Figure 4 depicts that this effect is particularly important for the
PMs. PMs in poorer crew groups paid considerably (40%) less attention to airspeed monitoring
than the ones in the best performing crew groups.
To gain a deeper understanding at an individual level, we then conducted qualitative analyses to
examine pilots’ performance errors (PM errors vs. PF errors) and their ability to “visually” cross-
check critical flight parameters (see Table 1). For instance, we checked to determine if the PFs
glanced at the landing-gear indicator right after the PFs’ action because one PM forgot to retract it.
We also verified if the PFs checked the PMs’ settings by glancing at the ND or at the FCU because
some PMs did not interact correctly with the autoflight panel.
Figure 5 illustrates poor monitoring skills of one pilot (PM 11; see Table 1). This PM exhibited
excessive focus on entering the data into the FCU (2,500 ft, 340°) for 15 s to the detriment of the
monitoring of the flight deck. Black dots indicate the current gaze position, time origin being aligned
to the initiation of the go-around procedure.
Table 1 gave us some insights into the visual cross-checking behavior of both pilots. To gain a
deeper understanding of the crews’ overall visual attention on important flight-path parameters
during go-around, we examined how much time the crew neglected critical parameters related to the
energy and the trajectory of the airplane. Therefore, we measured the maximum lapse of time during
which those AOIs were not glanced at by any of the crew members, PM or PF (i.e., the period of
neglect or “first passage time;” Moray, 1986). Figure 6 represents the crews’ median values of the
longest period without a fixation on the primary flight parameters: speed, attitude indicator, altitude
indicator and ND. Figure 6 shows that primary flight parameters such as the airspeed or altitude
Figure 4. Percentage of dwell time (%) on the airspeed indicator predict crews’ differential performance during the go-around
(poorer vs. best performing crews). Bars represent standard error.
were sometimes not monitored by any of the crew members during more than 12 s or 14 s,
respectively. However this neglect period did not differ statistically between the two performance
groups.
Discussion
In this observational study, 12 crews, equipped with eye trackers, were placed in realistic flight
simulators, facing a demanding go-around scenario. Our measurements allowed us to address the
following questions.
Figure 5. Ocular behavior of Pilot Monitoring No.11 during the go-around phase. Note that this pilot was excessively focused on the
flight control unit (FCU) 15 s after the beginning of the go-around. MCP = mode control panel; MCDU = Multipurpose Control Display
Unit; ECAM/EICAS = Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring/Engine-Indicating and Crew-Alerting System; ND = navigation display;
FMA = Flight Mode Annunciator; PFD = primary flight display.
Figure 6. Maximum time between fixations on the four areas of interest (AOIs) related to the energy or the trajectory of the
aircraft during the go-around. These are shown as boxplots with whiskers. The bold band represents the median values of
maximum time interval without a fixation of either pilot flying or pilot monitoring according to the six main AOIs. The upper and
lower ends of the boxes equals the 95% confidence interval. Whiskers represent ranges. AS = airspeed; AI = attitude indicator; ALT
= altitude indicator; ND = navigation display.
How Did the Crew Manage the Go-Around Execution?
The analysis of pilot performance revealed that all flight crews managed to stabilize the aircraft in
accordance with ATC clearances. However, debriefing results indicated that the execution of the
maneuver was particularly demanding. During the debriefing session, all PMs—except one—high-
lighted the complexity of the procedure and reported difficulties. In particular, they felt over-
whelmed by the PF’s callouts, ATC particular instructions, and the numerous actions to be
performed during a short period of time. As stated by one pilot, “The diverse nature of the tasks
and the speed at which they must be performed generate stress, notably when the startle effect is also
included in the situation. Since stress reduces our ability to cope with complex actions, performance
levels drop during go-arounds.”
Moreover, only 3 crews out of 12 were able to correctly read back the complete ATC
instructions while programming them rapidly in the flight-control panel. Recalling ATC instruc-
tions involves working memory abilities (Helleberg & Wickens, 2003; Risser, Scerbo, Baldwin, &
McNamara, 2003; Taylor, O’Hara, Mumenthaler, Rosen, & Yesavage, 2005; Taylor et al., 1994)
that are known to be negatively affected by pilot workload (Durantin, Scannella, Gateau,
Delorme, & Dehais, 2015; Gateau, Durantin, Lancelot, Scannella, & Dehais, 2015). Two thirds
of the crews committed at least one error and half of the crews experienced significant
flight-path deviations. Importantly, such deviations appear to lead to numerous accidents
observed during go-around (BEA, 2013). Particularly, the PM plays a crucial role for the
monitoring of flight-path deviations (Reynal et al., 2016). In the next sections, we discuss the
eye-tracking results that could support this hypothesis.
How did the PF and the PM Distribute Their Visual Attention During the Management of the
Go-Around?
During the final approach, the PF’s scanning behavior was consistent with that observed by Sarter
et al. (2007; see Steelman et al., 2011 for detailed analysis) and Huettig, Anders, and Tautz (1999).
Importantly, we found changes in the pilots’ scanning patterns during the go-around execution:
● Both pilots paid less attention to the OTW during go-around, looking outside less than 5% of
the time. In contrast, they spent up to 40% looking outside during the final approach. This
behavior is understandable because landing on the runway is no longer the objective. Pilots
needed to redistribute their attention on the flight deck to control the go-around manoeuver.
This finding is in line with previous studies that demonstrated that the OTW is mainly scanned
during approach (Huettig et al., 1999; Sarter et al., 2007).
● Airspeed scanning increased for both pilots. This is understandable due to the increased
concern for stall at a potential high angle of attack and the need to retract the flaps with
regard to specific speed values.
● ND monitoring increased for both pilots. This behavior is consistent with the careful monitor-
ing of the trajectory and potential incoming traffic.
In addition, there were important shifts in relative responsibility for the two pilots:
● The PF devoted more visual attention to AI monitoring than did the PM. This is logical
because this instrument displays the flight director. Indeed, the PF had to follow the flight
director to fly the selected path during go-around.
● The PM, shedding some visual attention for the two instruments above (AI and ND), greatly
increased FCU scanning, involved with setting changing flight modes and targets.
In addition, the analysis of the explore/exploit ratio confirmed that the PF and PM used different
ocular behaviors during the go-around. The PF was mainly in an exploit/focus mode, whereas the
PM was in a more explore/monitoring mode. This finding is also consistent with the crew’s
attentional distribution during go-around. The PF looked mainly at three AOIs located in the
primary flight display (PFD; speed, attitude and altitude indicators: 70%). This result confirms
that the role of the PF is to “fly” the aircraft while controlling the flight path. In contrast, the
PM’s visual attention during the go-around is spread more broadly over the different AOIs, with
briefer dwells mainly to check that parameters are within range. Taken together, these results
confirmed that the PF and the PM used different scanning strategies according to their predefined
roles.
Did the PF’s and the PM’s Visual Scan Ensure an Efficient Cross-Checking of the Flight
Parameters?
The pilot-performance results emphasized that teamwork was not efficient for more than half of the
crew during go-around execution because it led to error detection issues. How can we explain these
deviations? Was this due to collective or individual “neglect” of specific AOIs? Is it possible to make
a link between visual scanning behavior and overall crew performance? We might expect some
differences here, based on the prior research of Wickens et al. (2008) that proficiency in traffic
detection was related to individual differences in overall scanning, and of Bellenkes, Wickens, and
Kramer (1997) and Schriver, Morrow, Wickens, and Talleur (2008), who observed instrument-
scanning differences related to pilot expertise. Lefrancois, Matton, Gourinat, Peysakhovich, and
Causse (2016) showed that gaze allocation of pilots who failed to stabilize their approach was
suboptimal and more variable compared to the more proficient pilots.
Our statistical analyses disclosed that only one AOI clearly discriminated the six best from the six
poorest performing crews: the AI. The poorer performing crews, particularly the PM, allocated
significantly less attention to the AOI. Although none of the crews experienced aerodynamic stall
during our experiment, the monitoring of the aircraft’s energy state is critical and has been a
contributing factor in several loss-of-control accidents during the go-around (BEA, 2013). This
assumption is consistent with a recent eye-tracking study that revealed that PMs exhibited insuffi-
cient monitoring of speed during final approach (Reynal et al., 2016). Moreover, the analysis of the
maximum time interval without a fixation on the relevant AOIs by the crew (see Figure 6) also
appears to support this lack of monitoring. These qualitative results revealed that there were
important lapses of time during which critical parameters such as the airspeed indication (12 s) or
the altimeter (14 s) were not glanced at by any crew member. Keeping in mind that the mean time of
the go-around execution was about 75 s, we could argue that any deviations of these parameters
might remain unnoticed.
Eventually some explanations might be found in the PF’s and the PM’s visual strategies on
specific AOIs. The individual eye-tracking analyses revealed that half of the PFs did not glance at the
landing-gear indicator to verify that their PM effectively retracted it. In one case, the crew performed
the go-around with the landing gear still lowered. More interestingly, four PFs out of six who
deviated from the expected trajectory did not verify their PM’s inputs. These PFs were following the
flight director displayed on the AI. Two of these PFs (2 and 8) were particularly focused on the flight
director to follow the flight path during the go-around. For instance, the PF 2 was so focused during
11 s on flying the flight director that he remained unaware that his PM had programmed an
erroneous lateral flight path. Another noticeable illustration of such attentional issues occurred
with PF 8, who focused for 22 s on the vertical flight path to capture the target altitude, to the
detriment of the monitoring of the horizontal flight. This attentional fixation on one axis to the
detriment of another has been identified as a causal factor of critical events during the approach
phase (BEA, 2004a, 2004b).
For their part, the PMs failed to detect their PFs’ flight-path deviation in five cases out of six. PM 9
and 11 were highly focused on the flight-control panel for more than 12 and 15 s, respectively (see
Figure 5) when their PF deviated. It is worth noting that all PMs spent a substantial amount of time
(13.3%) interacting with the flight-control panel, entering the ATC instructions. In general, pilots are
trained to glance at the PFD while entering the data in the flight-control panel but none of the PMs
exhibited this expected behavior. Another task that captured the three other PMs’ attention (2, 7 and 8)
was the flaps management, which prevented them from monitoring the flight path. These suboptimal
monitoring abilities exhibited by some PMs are consistent with a recent eye-tracking study that
revealed that PMs exhibited inadequate scanning during final approach (Reynal et al., 2016).
Conclusions
Our results confirmed that the go-around was a challenging task and that eye tracking
provides valuable data to better understand pilots’ performance. More interestingly, the qua-
litative and quantitative analyses of this study expanded the earlier findings from the ASAGA
survey and accident analysis during go-around (BEA, 2013). Especially the eye-tracking mea-
surements have highlighted several issues related to cockpit design and the monitoring of the
flight parameters.
First, two user interfaces, namely the flight director (displayed in the AI) and the FCU have
sometimes excessively captured respectively the PF’s (see Table 1) and PM’s visual attention (see
Table 1 and Figure 3). Emphasis should be placed on training the PF to avoid excessive visual
tunneling on the flight director, whereas the PM should be trained to interact with the FCU when
flying low level; that is, checking the settings on the PFD while entering the data on the FCU.
Second, the eye-tracking measurements emphasized the essential role of the PM in the detection
of flight-parameter deviations. The PM’s numerous tasks (e.g., interaction with ATC, FCU settings,
and flaps management) can leave this pilot ill equipped to face the sudden onsets of these actions
and to monitor the flight path in the meantime. These results might appear surprising, as primary
flight training emphasizes instrument scanning and cross-checking. Further studies are needed to
confirm these findings as our sample size was small. It would also be relevant to manipulate other
variables, such as round dial versus glass cockpit, low versus high level of automation, or experienced
versus newly trained pilots, to disentangle all the variables that might affect visual scanning.
We believe that our results with those of others (Lefrancois et al., 2016; Reynal et al., 2016)
support the recommendation made by the Federal Aviation Administration, stating that by March
2019, air carriers must include specific training to improve monitoring (see Flight Safety Foundation,
2014, p. 3). Specifically, our findings propose that training should emphasize the cross-monitoring of
the primary flight parameters related to the energy state and the flight path of the airplane in
demanding flight scenarios.
ORCID
Frédéric Dehais http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0854-7919
References
BEA. (2000). Accident 23 August 2000 on approach to Bahrain A320 (BEA a40-ek000823). Paris, France: Author.
BEA. (2004a). Accident on 22 June 2003 at Guipavas (21) to the Bombardier Canadair CL-600 2B 19 registered F-GRJS
operated by Brit Air (No. f-js030622a). Paris, France: Author.
BEA. (2004b). Serious incident at Nantes on 21 March 2004 to the MD-83 registered SU-BMF operated by Luxor Air
(No. su-f040321a). Paris, France: Author.
BEA. (2013). Study of aeroplane state awareness during go-around (No. FRAN-2013-023). Paris, France: Author.
Bellenkes, A. H., Wickens, C. D., & Kramer, A. F. (1997). Visual scanning and pilot expertise: The role of attentional
flexibility and mental model development. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 68(7), 569–579.
Cohen, J. (1992). Statistical power analysis. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 1(3), 98–101. doi:10.1111/1467-
8721.ep10768783
Dehais, F., Causse, M., & Pastor, J. (2008, June). Embedded eye tracker in a real aircraft: New perspectives on pilot/
aircraft interaction monitoring. Paper presented at ICRAT’08 Conference, Fairfax, VA.
Dehais, F., Peysakhovich, V., Scannella, S., Fongue, J., & Gateau, T. (2015). Automation surprise in aviation: Real-time
solutions. In P. Palanque, J. Vanderonckt, and M. Winckler (Eds.), Proceedings of the 33rd annual ACM conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems (pp. 2525–2534). New York: ACM Press.
Dehais, F., Tessier, C., Christophe, L., & Reuzeau, F. (2010). The perseveration syndrome in the pilot’s activity:
Guidelines and cognitive countermeasures. In Proceedings of Human Error, Safety and Systems Development (pp.
68–80). New York: Springer.
Durantin, G., Scannella, S., Gateau, T., Delorme, A., & Dehais, F. (2015). Processing functional near infrared
spectroscopy signal with a Kalman filter to assess working memory during simulated flight. Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience, 9.
Dutch Safety Board. (2010). Crashed during approach, Boeing 737-800, near Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, 25 February
2009. The Hague, The Netherlands: Author.
Flight Safety Foundation. (2014). The active pilot monitoring working group: A practical guide for improving flight path
monitoring. Virginia: Author.
Gateau, T., Durantin, G., Lancelot, F., Scannella, S., & Dehais, F. (2015). Real-time state estimation in a flight simulator
using fNIRS. PLoS ONE, 10(3), e0121279. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121279
Goldberg, J. H., & Kotval, X. P. (1999). Computer interface evaluation using eye movements: Methods and constructs.
International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 24, 631–645. doi:10.1016/S0169-8141(98)00068-7
Helleberg, J., & Wickens, C. D. (2003). Effects of data link modality and display redundancy on pilot performance: An
attentional perspective. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 13, 189–210. doi:10.1207/
S15327108IJAP1303_01
Huettig, G., Anders, G., & Tautz, A. (1999, March). Mode awareness in amodern glass cockpit: Attention allocation to
mode information. Paper presented at the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, OH.
Kasarskis, P., Stehwien, J., Hickox, J., Aretz, A., & Wickens, C. (2001). Comparison of expert and novice scan
behaviors during VFR flight. In Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology.
Columbus, OH: Ohio State University.
Lefrancois, O., Matton, N., Gourinat, Y., Peysakhovich, V., & Causse, M. (2016, September). The role of pilots’
monitoring strategies in flight performance. Paper presented at the European Association for Aviation Psychology
Conference, Cascais, Portugal.
Moray, N. (1986). Monitoring behavior and supervisory control. In K. Boff, L. Kaufman, & J. Thomas (Eds.),
Handbook of perception and human performance (Vol. 2, pp. 40–51). New York, NY: Wiley.
Mumaw, R. J., Sarter, N. B., & Wickens, C. D. (2001, May). Analysis of pilots’ monitoring and performance on an
automated flight deck. Paper presented at the 11th biennial meeting of the International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology, Columbus, OH.
National Transportation Safety Board. (2013). Crash during a nighttime nonprecision instrument approach to landing
UPS Flight 1354 airbus A300-600, N155UP Birmingham, Alabama August 14, 2013 (NTSB/AAR-14/02 PB2014-
107898). Washington: Author.
National Transportation Safety Board. (2015). Descent below visual glidepath and impact with seawall, Asiana Airlines
flight 214 Boeing 777-200ER, HL7742, San Fransisco, California, July 6, 2013 (NTSB/AAR-14/01 PB2014-105984).
Washington: Author.
Pinet, J., & Sheridan, T. B. (2016). Book review: Facing the unexpected in flight. IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems
Magazine, 31(8), 46.
Pizziol, S., Tessier, C., & Dehais, F. (2014). Petri net-based modelling of human–automation conflicts in aviation.
Ergonomics, 57, 319–331. doi:10.1080/00140139.2013.877597
Regis, N., Dehais, F., Tessier, C., & Gagnon, J. (2012). Ocular metrics for detecting attentional tunnelling. Toulouse,
France: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society–Chapter Europe.
Reynal, M., Colineaux, Y., Vernay, A., & Dehais, F. (2016, October). Pilot flying vs. Pilot monitoring during the
approach phase: An eye–tracking study. Paper presented at HCI-Aero 2016, International Conference on Human–
Computer Interaction in Aerospace, Paris.
Reynal, M., Rister, F., Scannella, S., Wickens, C. D., & Dehais, F. (2017, May). Investigating pilot’s decision making
when facing an unstabilized approach: An eye tracking study. Paper presented at the 19th Biennial International
Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Dayton, OH.
Risser, M. R., Scerbo, M. W., Baldwin, C. L., & McNamara, D. S. (2003). ATC commands executed in speech and text
formats: Effects of task interference. In Proceedings of the 12th Biennial International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology (pp. 999–1004), Dayton, OH.
Sarter, N., Mumaw, R., & Wickens, C. (2007). Pilots’ monitoring strategies and performance on automated flight
decks: An empirical study combining behavioral and eye-tracking data. Human Factors, 49, 347. doi:10.1518/
001872007X196685
Schriver, A. T., Morrow, D. G., Wickens, C. D., & Talleur, D. A. (2008). Expertise differences in attentional strategies
related to pilot decision making. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 50,
864–878. doi:10.1518/001872008X374974
Spangler, C., & Park, A. (2010). Loss of control on Approach Colgan Air, Inc., operating as Continental Connection
Flight 3407 Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ Clarence Center, New York February 12, 2009. In ACM SIGGRAPH
2010 Dailies (p. 7). New York: ACM.
Starcke, K., & Brand, M. (2012). Decision making under stress: A selective review. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral
Reviews, 36, 1228–1248. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.02.003
Steelman, K. S., McCarley, J. S., & Wickens, C. D. (2011). Modeling the control of attention in visual workspaces.
Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 53, 142–153. doi:10.1177/
0018720811404026
Stokes, A. F., Kemper, K. L., & Marsh, R. (1992). Time-stressed decision-making: A study of expert and novice aviators
(Tech. Rep. No. ARL-93-1/INEL-93-1). Savoy, IL: University of Illinois, Aviation Research Laboratory.
Stokes, A., & Kite, K. (1994). Flight stress: Stress, fatigue, and performance in aviation. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Taylor, J., O’Hara, R., Mumenthaler, M., Rosen, A., & Yesavage, J. (2005). Cognitive ability, expertise, and age
differences in following air-traffic control instructions. Psychology and Aging, 20, 117–133. doi:10.1037/0882-
7974.20.1.117
Taylor, J., Yesavage, J., Morrow, D., Dolhert, N., Brooks, J., III, & Poon, L. (1994). The effects of information load and
speech rate on younger and older aircraft pilots’ ability to execute simulated air-traffic controller instructions. The
Journal of Gerontology, 49, P191. doi:10.1093/geronj/49.5.P191
Tessier, C., & Dehais, F. (2012). Authority management and conflict solving in human–machine systems.
AerospaceLab, 4, 1–10.
UK Civilian Aviation Authority. (2013). Loss of control action group, monitoring matters—Guidance on the develop-
ment of pilot monitoring skills (CAA Paper 2013/02). London: Author.
U.S. Department of Transportation. (2015). Safety alert for operators, roles and responsibility for PF and PM (No.
15011). Washington, DC: Flight Standards Service.
Wickens, C. D., Hooey, B. L., Gore, B. F., Sebok, A., & Koenicke, C. S. (2009). Identifying black swans in NextGen:
Predicting human performance in off-nominal conditions. Human Factors, 51, 638–651. doi:10.1177/
0018720809349709
Wickens, C. D., McCarley, J. S., Alexander, A. L., Thomas, L. C., Ambinder, M., & Zheng, S. (2008). Attention-
situation awareness (A-SA) model of pilot error. In D. Foyle and B. Hooey (Eds.), Human performance modeling in
aviation (pp. 213–239). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum
